Hobson’s Choice: Security and Privacy Permission in Android and iOS Devices by Hegarty, RC et al.
Hobson’s Choice: Security and Privacy Permissions in Android and iOS Devices
John Haggerty, Thomas Hughes-Roberts and Robert Hegarty*
School of Science and Technology, Nottingham Trent University, Clifton Campus, 
Clifton Lane, Nottingham, NG11 8NS, United Kingdom
*School  of  Computing,  Mathematics  and  Digital  Technology,  Manchester 
Metropolitan University, Chester Street, Manchester, M1 5GD, United Kingdom
john.haggerty@ntu.ac.uk; thomas.hughesroberts@ntu.ac.uk; 
r.hegarty@mmu.ac.uk
Abstract.  The use of smartphones and tablet devices has grown rapidly over recent 
years and the widespread availability of software, often from unknown developers, 
has led to security and privacy concerns. In order to prevent security compromises,  
these devices use access control as a means by which a user is able to specify an 
application’s ability to interact with services and data. However, the use of access  
control  as  a  security  countermeasure  in  this  environment  is  severely limited.  For 
example,  once permissions are granted  to  software,  they may share data,  such as 
location or unique identifiers with third persons without informing the user, whether 
or  not  the  application  is  itself  running.  This  paper  presents  the  results  of  a 
comparative study conducted with computing students at two UK universities that 
identifies the issues surrounding software access control permissions in Android and 
iOS operating systems. Through this study,  we are able to quantify the impact  of 
security  access  permissions  on  mobile  device  security and  privacy,  even  amongst 
specialist users.
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1. Introduction
The use of smartphones and tablet devices has grown rapidly over recent years. 
The relatively low cost and high power of such devices has made them attractive to 
consumers,  providing  them  with  a  truly  mobile  computing  experience.  The 
widespread adoption of mobile devices has resulted in the availability of thousands of 
applications for  their  owners.  There  are  two models  of  software provision in  this 
market;  open  and  closed.  In  open  markets,  such  as  Google  Play,  application 
developers are able to distribute their software for a small fee or free of charge with 
little control by the owners of the store. In closed markets, such as the Apple App 
store, the distribution of software is more tightly controlled by the market owners. 
Software from both markets can be downloaded to a device and installed instantly, 
making it an attractive service for users and automated, dynamic analysis techniques 
are employed to identify malware. 
The widespread availability of software, often from unknown developers, has led 
to security and privacy concerns.  Many black market  software stores exist,  where 
malware is crafted into pirated commercial software and provided to end users free of 
charge. For example, viruses and Trojan applications can be made readily available by 
malicious  developers  through  both  legitimate  and  pirate  software  stores  and 
researchers have demonstrated that it is possible to obfuscate malware from detection 
techniques (Apvrille and Nigram, 2014). This software can compromise the security 
of the device and the user by sending messages to premium rate services or stealing 
information, such as logon credentials or passwords (Delac et al, 2011). Alternatively, 
many  applications  interact  with  other  online  services,  such  as  Google,  through 
authentication tokens (Google, 2015). These tokens are sometimes sent in plain text, 
and can therefore be intercepted by a malicious application monitoring data sent from 
the device or a network to which they belong, to steal these credentials and access 
private information held elsewhere online.
In  order  to  prevent  security  and  privacy  compromises,  both  Android  and  iOS 
devices  use  access  control  as  a  means  by  which  a  user  is  able  to  specify  an  
application’s ability to interact with services and data. For example, in the Android 
operating system, application data is  held in  isolated environments  within the file 
system and inter-process communications are controlled through access permissions. 
The access rights depend upon the software to be used and the services that  they 
require. For example, the BBC iPlayer application requires access to internet services 
to stream multimedia,  phone calls so that the software is notified when the phone 
rings, and system tools to prevent the device entering sleep mode (Madden, 2012). 
Irrespective of the software and its source, users readily provide applications that they 
download with a range of permissions within the operating system.
However,  the  use  of  access  control  as  a  security  countermeasure  in  this 
environment  is  severely  limited.  For  example,  once  permissions  are  granted  to 
software,  they  may  share  data,  such  as  location  or  unique  identifiers  with  third 
persons without informing the user, whether or not the application is itself running.  
The  granularity  of  many  requested  access  rights  is  too  coarse  to  be  useful,  for 
example,  the  Internet  permission  provides  broad-ranging  capabilities  without 
restricting access to specific URLs or domains. In the Android operating system, a 
user  is  presented  with  a  list  of  capabilities,  such  as  network  services,  location 
information, access to personal data, etc. upon installation. The user is not able to 
selectively grant access rights to the application as the only choice is to install the 
software or not, with all the permissions required by the developers rather than owner  
of the device. In the iOS operating system, a user will only grant capabilities as they 
use the software. However, to use the software with the functionality required by the  
user, they must grant the permissions requested. In both models, the user is presented 
with  Hobson’s  choice;  they  are  presented  with  the  choice  of  installing  or  not 
installing, or using or not using, the software, with the potential cost to the security 
and privacy of information if they choose to install or run an application. Permission 
revocation is not an option unless the software is removed wholesale and users often 
fail to understand the risk posed by composite permissions. More importantly,  the 
decision to grant permissions is being made by users that are potentially unaware of 
the security implications of making such a choice.
This paper presents the results of a comparative study conducted with computing 
students  at  two  UK  universities  that  explores  issues  surrounding  software  access 
control permissions in Android and iOS operating systems. Through this study, we are 
able to quantify the impact of Android and iOS security access permissions on mobile 
phone device security and privacy, even amongst specialist users. In particular, the 
results of this survey identify the permissions that participants are prepared to accept  
in installing applications from unknown sources. Moreover, it identifies whether these 
permissions, if wide ranging or inappropriate for the application, are questioned by 
the  user.  This  paper  will  therefore  quantify the  problem of  access  control  in  the 
mobile environment and discuss appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the issue.
This paper is  organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 
posits  the  methodology used  for  the  comparative  survey.   Section  4  presents  the 
results  of  the  survey  and  discusses  their  significance  to  mobile  device  security. 
Finally, we make our conclusions and discuss further work.
2. Related Work
The most common operating systems in the mobile device market are Android and 
iOS, which combined accounted for over 90 per cent of smartphones in late 2014 
(IDC,  2015).  Both  of  these  operating  systems  are  based  on  the  Linux  kernel  to 
provide hardware abstraction; Android builds on Linux whilst iOS is derived from OS 
X,  a  variant  of  BSD UNIX.  On top of  the  kernel  are  the  native  libraries,  which  
provide some of the common services for applications and other programs. Running 
processes rely on virtualization, whereby a virtual machine (VM) runs an application 
in its own instance. On top of this layer is the application framework, where code 
running for and on the VM provides service to multiple operations.
Due to the popularity of such devices running this architecture, mobile security and 
privacy  has  received  much  attention.  In  particular,  their  widespread  use  has 
introduced a range of new threats as well as transposing issues long associated with 
more  traditional  computing  devices.  For  example,  Delac  et  al (2011)  present  an 
attacker-centric threat model for mobile devices. This model realizes that the sources 
of  threats  to  mobile  devices  are  wide  and  varied,  such  as  through  Bluetooth 
connections, access to the Internet or networks, or USB peripherals. Erturk (2012) 
identifies the issue of privacy-invasive adware on mobile devices that target open-
source  platforms  such  as  Android.  Frank  et  al (2012)  suggest  that  the  Android 
operating  system  and  Internet  access  through  social  network  services  such  as 
Facebook can provide third-party applications with access to user’s private data as 
well  as perform sensitive operations such as post  online messages or make phone 
calls. Many of these potential issues do not have to be developed by very experienced 
software  developers  engineers  or  developers.  For  example,  Mylonas  et  al (2011) 
suggest  that  all  smartphone  platforms  could  be  used  by  average  developers  for 
attacking privacy or harvesting data without the user's knowledge or consent.
A number of countermeasures to these wide and varied threats have been proposed. 
For example, Batyuk et al (2011) posit a scheme whereby applications available via 
the Android market place are assessed for security vulnerabilities and a report is made 
available to users. This scheme also reverse-engineers applications to adjust security 
settings according to the user’s requirements. Ghosh  et al (2012) propose a scheme 
for user privacy based on contextual information analysis to maintain user privacy 
when using applications that access and share device location and surroundings data.  
Yuhao Luo et al (2013) posit a method for the protection of user data by introducing a 
secure, enhanced kernel and data-at-rest encryption. In this way, they aim to provide 
data protection rather than address application privileges. Encryption has since been 
implemented  and  deployed  in  recent  versions  of  the  Android  and  IOS  operating 
systems,  with Android employing SELinux to provide Mandatory Access  Control. 
Fazeen  and  Dantu  (2014)  propose  a  model  for  the  identification  of  Android 
applications’ intentions to identify malware through permission requests.
However, the issue remains that the principal defence strategy employed in both 
Android and iOS devices is based on the granting of access rights to applications, 
often obtained from unverified sources. This is compounded by the current practice of 
only  allowing  access  to  an  application  if,  and  only  if,  the  user  grants  all  the 
capabilities presented to them by that software. 
Due to the complexity of applications running on powerful  mobile devices,  we 
posit that it is difficult for users to determine the implications of the often loosely 
scoped  permissions.  This  problem  is  worsened  by  the  security  implications  of 
composite permissions; with permissions that seem harmless in isolation, presenting a 
security risk in  combination with other  permissions.  As mentioned previously the 
Internet  permission  is  loosely  scoped,  permitting  malicious  applications  to  leak 
information  obtained  from  other  permissions  granted  by  the  user,  this  ‘gateway 
permission’ requires much finer grain control. Tighter granularity for key permissions 
such as Internet access would reduce the ability of malicious applications to breach 
user privacy. If URL or domain specific permissions were provided, the increase in 
transparency  would  enable  users  to  make  more  informed  decisions  about  the 
applications they install, and the destination of data leaving their devices.
The  above  challenges  have  emerged  as  consumers  shift  from  a  conventional 
computing environment,  using PCs and laptops to a mobile environment in which 
they use smartphones and tablets.  Unfortunately it  is  not  immediately apparent  to 
many users, that mobile devices contain much more sensitive personal information 
than  conventional  computing  devices.  Coupled  with  this  conventional  computing 
environments do not typically require the end user to grant permissions, rather a user 
agrees to a EULA (often without reading it).Thus, even experienced computer users 
are not well equipped to deal with the threats to privacy posed by the transition from a 
conventional to mobile computing environment. A further ‘at risk’ group are users 
who have little to no experience of computing devices; this group has stumbled into 
computing due to the low cost and high availability of smart phones, and may be 
unaware of the threat computing devices pose to their personal privacy.
While malware is usually found in software from unverified sources, there have 
been instances of malware in the app stores of both iOS and Android (Porter Felt et  
al, 2011). The user’s judgment may be impaired through the false sense of security 
that using an official app store provides. Both the major app stores deploy automated 
(e.g. Google Bouncer) and manual vetting of applications, however the purpose of 
such vetting is to identify malware. These vetting processes do not take account of the 
user’s privacy, with the choice of whether to accept permissions being delegated to 
the  end  user.  Furthermore,  the  way in which  consent  is  obtained  differs  between 
platforms with some requiring full consent at installation and others during run-time. 
(Porter Felt  et  al,  2012).  The question is therefore raised: does the way in which 
permissions are requested influence the extent of consent and general user consent? 
Given the prominent role the user plays in managing the security of a personal mobile 
device, understanding end-user perceptions is vital in designing appropriate solutions. 
In the next section, we present the methodology of a survey of computing students 
at two UK universities that attempts to quantify the security challenges that this model 
raises.
3. Survey methodology
The aim of the survey is to begin exploring how users approach permissions on a 
mobile device by comparing the two prevalent  methods of  application permission 
acceptance in iOS and Android devices. Participants are therefore presented with an 
application’s permissions request and asked what their reaction would be: accept or 
reject. They are then asked to provide an explanation for their choice.
The first part of the survey presents the permission screens as they would within an 
Android OS. That is, in order to download and install the app they must agree to all 
the required permissions. The second part of the survey presents the permissions as  
they would be found within iOS where acceptance is required in increments and based 
on the task at hand. To that end the participant is presented with a sentence detailing  
the context of the permissions request; for example, “you wish to make an in-app 
purchase, the app requires permission to access…”
Table  1  provides  an  overview  of  the  applications  present  in  the  survey,  the 
permissions of which are taken from actual software on the market. 
Table  - Part 1, Applications Overview
App From  (at  time  of 
survey)
Notes
Social Network Facebook
Messenger Facebook Messenger
Invasive Flashlight High Powered Torch
Less invasive Flashlight LED Torch Only  if  rejected 
invasive Flashlight
File Store Dropbox
Game Angry  Birds 
Transformers
Invasive Camera Google Camera
Less Invasive Camera Camera 1080 Only  if  rejected 
invasive camera
Banking HSBC
Loyalty Card Game Rewards
For each of these applications, the participant is presented with the generic name of 
the application (e.g. “you wish to download a social networking application”) and an 
accompanying permissions screen, an example of which can be seen in Figure 1.
Figure  - Example permissions screen
The  second  half  of  the  survey  took three  of  these  applications  and  split  their  
permissions based on a specific usage of the software. Table 2 provides and overview 
of the applications presented to the respondent and the contextual statements behind 
the permission request. 
Table  - Part 2, Apps overview
App Context Permissions
App 1 – Social Network Install and Launch Device
Profile
Contacts/Calendar
Wi-Fi
Post a picture on timeline Photos/Media/Files
Camera/Microphone
Location
Text  Control  over 
account
SMS
Phone
App 2 – Game Install and Launch Profile
Wi-Fi
Phone state
Save Game Photos/media/files
Make an in-app  purchase 
over SMS
In-app purchases
SMS
Phone
Play-for-Free Location
Phone state
App 3 – Banking App Install and Launch Identity
Phone state
Find local branch Location
Remote check deposit Camera/Microphone
Transfer to Contact Phone
Contacts List
Following the review of the two methods of permissions acceptance participants 
are asked which approach they prefer in managing their privacy. 
Responses to each set of permission requests are compared against each other to 
examine if the greater degree of control in the granular permissions approach does 
indeed lead to a more selective acceptance. 
Participants on computing courses at two Universities were approached to take part 
in  the  study  which  was  completed  within  a  scheduled  lab  session.  In  total,  60 
participants took the survey (50 male, 10 female); it is noted that there is a bias in the  
sample in terms of gender due to the sampling method chosen and as such this cannot  
be considered a true representation of  a full  population. Of this sample,  the same 
number of participants used iOS as Android as an operating system: 45.8% each with 
the remainder using other OS’s. This does not reflect the market shares in 2014 as 
suggested by IDC (2015) where Android accounts for 84.4 per cent of the mobile 
market compared to iOS’s 11.7 per cent in the last quarter.
The following section summarizes the results from this survey and presents points 
for further discussion from the data obtained. 
4. Survey Results
The breakdown of acceptance for whole permission requirements (part  1 of the 
instrument) is broken down in table 1.  
Table  - Whole Acceptance Summary
App Part 1 % Accept
Social Network 50%
Messenger 66.7%
Invasive Flashlight 18.3%
Less invasive Flashlight 61.2%
File Store 71.7%
Game 48.3%
Invasive Camera 28.3%
Less Invasive Camera 90.7%
Banking 60%
Loyalty Card 30%
Interestingly, despite only 50% of participants stating that they would accept the 
permissions for the social networking application, 80.7% of participants admitted to 
having the social networking app Facebook on their phone (which these permissions 
were taken from). Furthermore, if this particular response is broken down then the 
majority of  change is  from iOS users  where  74.1% would reject  the  permissions 
presented to them but 85.2% have the app on their phone. The change is much less 
pronounced in users of Android where 75% of participants stated they would accept 
the permissions with a similar amount (71.4%) admitting to having the app on their 
phones.  Indeed,  it  is  the Android users  who would be more  used to  this  style  of 
permission acceptance. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was a large increase in the number of acceptances in 
the two applications where a less invasive version was offered if the first was rejected. 
Participants stated that the requests were much more reasonable: “it needs this”, “only 
requires  relevant  access  for  the  flashlight  to  function”.  This  would  suggest  that 
attention was paid to the permissions requested within the context of the survey and 
an assessment made as whether or not they are reasonable. However, a number of 
participants  still  felt  access  to  the  camera  was  unreasonable:  “it  would  still  have 
access  to  my  camera  and  microphone,  there  are  other  ways  of  turning  on  the 
flashlight”.  This  is  despite  the  flashlight  being  governed  by  the  same  set  of 
permissions as the camera in Android suggesting there is a lack of understanding of 
the  technical  aspect  of  permissions;  this  is  further  discussed  later  in  the  paper.  
Furthermore, a number of participants did state that the reason they accepted was “I  
always do it without thinking” and this was carried through to the survey for a number 
of example applications. 
Table  - Part 2 Permissions Overview
App Context % Accept
App 1 – Social Network Install and Launch 66.7%
Post a picture on timeline 75%
Text Control over account 65%
Accept to Each 40%
App 2 – Game Install and Launch 74.1%
Save Game 72.4%
Make an in-app  purchase 
over SMS
48.3%
Play-for-Free 52.6%
Accept to Each 24.6%
App 3 – Banking App Install and Launch 82.1%
Find local branch 89.3%
Remote check deposit 29.8%
Transfer to Contact 61.4%
Accept to Each 19.3%
Results from Table 4 would suggest that participants, when given the opportunity, 
will be more selective of their acceptable permissions. On each of the above sample 
scenarios the total amount of complete answers is less than the comparable app in the 
previous section. For example, 60% of participants confirmed that they would accept 
the banking app’s  permissions when all  are required  for  install  compared  to  only 
19.3% who confirmed that they would accept each of the permissions when given 
separately. This would espouse the benefits of more granular control over permissions 
on a mobile device. Indeed, the majority of participants (66.7%) preferred this style of 
permission management. However, they would still need to accept all permissions in 
totality were they to be able to use the software.
However, the likelihood of acceptance appears to be coupled with understanding. 
For example, 89.3% of participants allowed the banking app to access the devices 
location to find the local branch. Reasons for acceptance appeared to suggest that the 
request reasonable: “It needs it”, “Seems helpful”, “Needs to locate you and find the 
nearest branch”. When understanding is lacking the likelihood of response is less. For 
example, in the same app the permission requires access to a camera to take a picture 
of check in order to make a remote deposit. Only 29.8% of participants agreed to this  
particular access: “Why would it need my camera”, “Camera not needed”, “I don’t 
think it needs these” etc. This reflects the approach some app developers are taking,  
by explaining the reason behind permissions in the app market, in order encourage 
users to install applications with obscure looking permissions.
5. Conclusions and further work
Mobile devices and their associated software stores have become a ubiquitous part 
of society. Users from a wide spectrum of backgrounds frequently interact with the 
permissions systems employed by app stores during the installation and updating of 
mobile apps. Mobile devices are much more integrated into our daily lives than fixed 
computers facilitating a wide variety of tasks (e.g.  diary,  contacts,  navigation, and 
photography).  As  a  consequence  they  contain  large  amounts  of  personal  data. 
Permissions  are  requested  to  enable  users  to  determine  what  personal  data 
applications have access to.
The findings of the survey illustrate that the respondents are aware of software 
permissions,  however  in  many instances  accept  the  permissions requested  for  the 
majority of applications. It is obvious that a user’s decision about whether to install an 
application or not is governed by more than just their permissions. 
Existing usage of a service is likely to increase the chances of an application being 
installed.  The  motivation  for  the  user  is  likely  that  of  acceptance;  “the  provider 
already has access to my data, as I’m already a user of the service”. Alternatively the 
reputation of the provider is assessed with the user making a value judgment based on 
the size/reach/popularity of an application provider and utility of the application. For 
example many users rejected the generic social network application, yet admitted to 
having software installed from one of the established social networks.
User understanding plays a large role in the acceptance of application permissions. 
It  was  clear  from  the  survey  responses  that  some  effort  was  made  by  users  to 
understand  why  permissions  are  requested.  However  awareness  of  the  broad 
granularity  of  permission  is  limited.  Additionally  users  demonstrate  their  lack  of 
understanding  of  the  underlying  fundamentals  of  how  some  applications  work, 
refusing  to  install  a  banking  application  that  required  camera  access  in  order  to 
scan/photograph a cheque. This limited understanding identified in the sample group 
of computer specialists is likely much larger in the general population. At present the 
user is provided with a list of the functionality each permission provides, rather than 
the  reason  that  the  permission  is  required,  leaving  the  user  to  guess  why  each 
permission  is  needed.  It  would  be  beneficial  if  a  description  of  the  reason  each 
permission request is being made was presented to the user during the installation 
process. The description could be derived from the requirements stage of the software 
development process. However, such additions to the application must not add to the 
complexity of the interaction or risk being similarly ignored by the user. The question 
is  therefore  raised:  how  can  users  be  made  aware  of  the  context  of  permission 
requests without adding to the complexity of the system? 
In spite of the additional factors considered by users installing applications, and 
misunderstandings related  to  the  permissions model,  a  more granular  approach to 
application permissions resulted in users being more selective about the software that 
they install, i.e. rejecting invasive applications.
We therefore  conclude  that  increased  choice,  realized  through a  more  granular 
approach to application permissions provides improvements to user privacy.
Further  work  is  required  to  determine  how  users  interact  with  an  application 
permission during a software update. The value judgment made by users is likely to 
vary when they are prompted to grant permissions for software that they have used 
frequently for an extended period of time.
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